

**AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 118–10**  
**OFFERED BY MR. KEATING OF MASSACHUSETTS**

At the end of title XVIII, add the following:

1     **Subtitle D—Black Sea Security Act**  
2   **of 2023**

3     **SEC. 1861. SHORT TITLE.**

4             This subtitle may be cited as the “Black Sea Security  
5 Act of 2023”.

6     **SEC. 1862. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BLACK SEA SECURITY.**

7             (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
8 gress that—

9                     (1) it is in the interest of the United States to  
10             support efforts to prevent the spread of further  
11             armed conflict in Europe by recognizing the Black  
12             Sea region as an arena of Russian aggression;

13                    (2) littoral states of the Black Sea are critical  
14             in countering aggression by the Government of the  
15             Russian Federation and contributing to the collec-  
16             tive security of NATO;

17                    (3) the repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and vio-  
18             lent attempts of the Russian Federation to expand  
19             its territory and control access to the Mediterranean  
20             Sea through the Black Sea constitutes a threat to

1 the national security of the United States and  
2 NATO;

3 (4) the United States condemns attempts by  
4 the Russian Federation to change or alter bound-  
5 aries in the Black Sea region by force or any means  
6 contrary to international law and to impose a sphere  
7 of influence across the region;

8 (5) the United States and its allies should  
9 robustly counter Russia's illegitimate territorial  
10 claims on the Crimean Peninsula, along Ukraine's  
11 territorial waters in the Black Sea and the Sea of  
12 Azov, in the Black Sea's international waters, and in  
13 the territories it is illegally occupying in Ukraine;

14 (6) the United States should continue to work  
15 within NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a  
16 long-term strategy to enhance security, establish a  
17 permanent, sustainable presence along NATO's east-  
18 ern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of its  
19 allies and partners in the region;

20 (7) the United States should work within  
21 NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a regular,  
22 rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;

23 (8) the United States should also work with the  
24 European Union on coordinating a strategy to sup-  
25 port democratic initiatives and economic prosperity

1 in the region, which includes two European Union  
2 members and four European Union aspirant nations;

3 (9) Turkey's behavior towards some regional al-  
4 lies and democratic states has been counter-  
5 productive and has contributed to increased tensions  
6 in the region, and Turkey should avoid any actions  
7 to further escalate regional tensions;

8 (10) the United States should work to foster  
9 dialogue among countries within the Black Sea re-  
10 gion to improve communication and intelligence  
11 sharing and increase cyber defense capabilities;

12 (11) countries with historic and economic ties  
13 to Russia are looking to the United States and Eu-  
14 rope to provide a positive economic presence in the  
15 broader region as a counterbalance to the Russian  
16 Federation's malign influence in the region;

17 (12) it is in the interest of the United States  
18 to support and bolster the economic ties between the  
19 United States and Black Sea states;

20 (13) the United States should support the ini-  
21 tiative undertaken by central and eastern European  
22 states to advance the Three Seas Initiative Fund to  
23 strengthen transport, energy, and digital infrastruc-  
24 ture connectivity in the region between the Adriatic  
25 Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea;

1           (14) there are mutually beneficial opportunities  
2           for increased investment and economic expansion,  
3           particularly on energy, climate, and transport infra-  
4           structure initiatives, between the United States and  
5           Black Sea states and the broader region;

6           (15) improved economic ties between the United  
7           States and the Black Sea states and the broader re-  
8           gion can lead to a strengthened strategic partner-  
9           ship;

10          (16) the United States must seek to address  
11          the food security challenges arising from disruption  
12          of Ukraine's Black Sea and Azov Sea ports, as this  
13          global challenge will have critical national security  
14          implications for the United States, our partners, and  
15          allies;

16          (17) Turkey, in coordination with the United  
17          Nations, has played an important role in alleviating  
18          global food insecurity by negotiating two agreements  
19          to allow grain exports from Ukrainian ports through  
20          a safe corridor in the Black Sea;

21          (18) Russia has a brutal history of using hun-  
22          ger as a weapon and must be stopped;

23          (19) countering the PRC's coercive economic  
24          pursuits remains an important policy imperative in  
25          order to further integrate the Black Sea states into

1 western economies and improve regional stability;  
2 and

3 (20) Turkey's continued delay in ratifying Swe-  
4 den and Finland's accession to NATO undermines  
5 the strength of the alliance and inhibits the united  
6 international response to Russia's unprovoked war in  
7 Ukraine.

8 **SEC. 1863. UNITED STATES POLICY.**

9 It is the policy of the United States to—

10 (1) actively deter the threat of Russia's further  
11 escalation in the Black Sea region and defend free-  
12 dom of navigation in the Black Sea to prevent the  
13 spread of further armed conflict in Europe;

14 (2) advocate within NATO, among NATO Al-  
15 lies, and within the European Union to develop a  
16 long-term coordinated strategy to enhance security,  
17 establish a permanent, sustainable presence in the  
18 eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience  
19 of United States allies and partners in the region;

20 (3) advocate within NATO and among NATO  
21 Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime pres-  
22 ence in the Black Sea;

23 (4) support and bolster the economic ties be-  
24 tween the United States and Black Sea partners and  
25 mobilize the Department of State, the Department

1 of Defense, and other relevant Federal departments  
2 and agencies by enhancing the United States pres-  
3 ence and investment in Black Sea states;

4 (5) provide economic alternatives to the PRC's  
5 coercive economic options that destabilize and fur-  
6 ther erode economic integration of the Black Sea  
7 states;

8 (6) ensure that the United States continues to  
9 support Black Sea states' efforts to strengthen their  
10 democratic institutions to prevent corruption and ac-  
11 celerate their advancement into the Euroatlantic  
12 community; and

13 (7) encourage the initiative undertaken by cen-  
14 tral and eastern European states to advance the  
15 Three Seas Initiative to strengthen transport, en-  
16 ergy, and digital infrastructure connectivity in the  
17 region between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and  
18 Black Sea.

19 **SEC. 1864. BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT**  
20 **STRATEGY.**

21 (a) **BLACK SEA SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT**  
22 **STRATEGY.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of  
23 the enactment of this Act, the National Security Council,  
24 in coordination with the Department of State, the Depart-  
25 ment of Defense, and other relevant Federal departments

1 and agencies, is authorized to direct an interagency strat-  
2 egy to increase coordination with NATO and the Euro-  
3 pean Union, deepen economic ties, strengthen energy secu-  
4 rity, support efforts to bolster their democratic resilience,  
5 and enhance security assistance with our regional partners  
6 in accordance with the values and interests of the United  
7 States.

8 (b) PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES.—The initiative es-  
9 tablished under subsection (a) shall have the following  
10 goals and objectives:

11 (1) Ensuring the efficient and effective delivery  
12 of security assistance to regional partners in accord-  
13 ance with the values and interests of the United  
14 States, prioritizing assistance that will bolster de-  
15 fenses against hybrid warfare and improve interoper-  
16 ability with NATO forces.

17 (2) Bolstering United States support for the re-  
18 gion’s energy security and integration with Europe  
19 and reducing their dependence on Russia while sup-  
20 porting energy diversification.

21 (3) Mitigating the impact of economic coercion  
22 by the Russian Federation and the PRC on Black  
23 Sea states and identifying new opportunities for for-  
24 eign direct investment from the United States and  
25 cooperating countries and the enhancement of

1 United States business ties with regional partners in  
2 accordance with the values and interests of the  
3 United States.

4 (4) Increasing high-level engagement between  
5 the United States and regional partners, and rein-  
6 forcing economic growth, financing quality infra-  
7 structure, and reinforcing trade with a focus on im-  
8 proving high-level economic cooperation.

9 (5) Increasing United States coordination with  
10 the European Union and NATO to maximize effec-  
11 tiveness and minimize duplication.

12 (c) ACTIVITIES.—

13 (1) SECURITY.—The strategy established under  
14 subsection (a) should include the following elements  
15 related to security:

16 (A) A plan to increase interagency coordi-  
17 nation on the Black Sea region.

18 (B) An assessment of whether a United  
19 States-led initiative with NATO allies to in-  
20 crease coordination, presence, and regional en-  
21 gagement among Black Sea states is advisable.

22 (C) A strategy to increase security assist-  
23 ance toward Black Sea states, focused on  
24 Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and  
25 Georgia.

1 (D) Prioritization of intelligence, surveil-  
2 lance, and reconnaissance systems to monitor  
3 Russia's operations in the Black Sea region.

4 (E) An assessment of the value of estab-  
5 lishing a joint, multinational three-star head-  
6 quarters on the Black Sea, responsible for plan-  
7 ning, readiness, exercises, and coordination of  
8 all Allied and partner military activity in the  
9 greater Black Sea region.

10 (F) An assessment of the challenges and  
11 opportunities of establishing a regular, rota-  
12 tional NATO maritime presence in the Black  
13 Sea, including an analysis of the capacity, capa-  
14 bilities, and commitment of NATO members to  
15 create this type of mission.

16 (G) An overview of Foreign Military Fi-  
17 nancing, International Military Education and  
18 Training, and other United States security as-  
19 sistance to the region.

20 (H) A plan for communicating the changes  
21 to NATO posture to the public in allied and  
22 partner countries, as well as to publics in the  
23 Russian Federation and Belarus.

24 (I) A plan for combating Russian  
25 disinformation and propaganda in the Black

1 Sea region, utilizing the resources of the United  
2 States Government, including the Global En-  
3 gagement Center.

4 (J) A plan to promote greater freedom of  
5 navigation to allow for greater security and eco-  
6 nomic Black Sea access.

7 (2) ECONOMIC PROSPERITY.—The strategy es-  
8 tablished under subsection (a) shall include the fol-  
9 lowing elements related to economic prosperity:

10 (A) A strategy to foster dialogue between  
11 experts from the United States and from the  
12 Black Sea states on economic expansion, for-  
13 eign direct investment, strengthening rule of  
14 law initiatives, and mitigating economic coer-  
15 cion by Russia and the PRC.

16 (B) A strategy for all the relevant Federal  
17 departments and agencies that contribute to  
18 United States economic statecraft to expand  
19 their presence and identify new opportunities  
20 for private investment with regional partners in  
21 accordance with the values and interests of the  
22 United States.

23 (C) Assessments on energy diversification,  
24 focusing on the immediate need to replace en-  
25 ergy supplies from Russia, and recognizing the

1 long-term importance of broader energy diver-  
2 sification, including clean energy initiatives.

3 (D) Assessments of potential food security  
4 solutions, including sustainable, long-term ar-  
5 rangements beyond the Black Sea Grain Initia-  
6 tive.

7 (3) DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE.—The strategy  
8 established under subsection (a) shall include the  
9 following elements related to democratic resilience:

10 (A) A strategy to increase independent  
11 media and United States-supported media ini-  
12 tiatives to combat foreign malign influence in  
13 the Black Sea region.

14 (B) Greater mobilization of initiatives  
15 spearheaded by the Global Engagement Center  
16 and the United States Agency for International  
17 Development to counter Russian propaganda  
18 and disinformation in the Black Sea region.

19 (4) REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY.—The strategy  
20 established under subsection (a) shall promote re-  
21 gional connectivity by sending high-level representa-  
22 tives of the Department of State or other agency  
23 partners to—

24 (A) the Black Sea region not less fre-  
25 quently than twice a year; and

1 (B) major regional fora on infrastructure  
2 and energy security, including the Three Seas  
3 Initiative Summit.

4 (d) IDENTIFICATION OF NECESSARY PROGRAMS AND  
5 RESOURCES.—Not later than 360 days after the date of  
6 the enactment of this Act, the interagency shall identify  
7 any necessary program, policy, or budgetary resources re-  
8 quired, by agency, to support implementation of the Black  
9 Sea Security Strategy for fiscal years 2024, 2025, and  
10 2026.

11 (e) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS  
12 AND AGENCIES.—Nothing under this section shall be  
13 deemed to authorize the National Security Council to as-  
14 sume any of the responsibilities or authorities of the head  
15 of any Federal department, agency, or office, including the  
16 foreign affairs responsibilities and authorities of the Sec-  
17 retary of State, to oversee the implementation of programs  
18 and policies under this section.

19 **SEC. 1865. DEFINITIONS.**

20 In this subtitle:

21 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
22 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
23 mittees” means—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
25 the Committee on Armed Services, and the

1           Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;  
2           and

3                   (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the  
4           Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-  
5           mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-  
6           resentatives.

7           (2) BLACK SEA STATES.—The term “Black Sea  
8           states” means Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova,  
9           Ukraine, and Georgia.

